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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIFTH AMENDMENT AND TAKINGS—COURTS 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS WILL IMPEDE ORDERLY CITY DEVELOPMENT 
BY LIMITING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ USE OF EXACTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT 
PLANNING. KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 133 
S. CT. 2586 (2013). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few consider how cities come to own their public parks or waterfront 
nature preserves. Most take these types of government amenities for granted 
and are surprised when they discover the source for a public space is a pri-
vate owner who gave the land to the city in exchange for the city’s allowing 
an expansion of the private owner’s enterprises. For example, a developer 
who files a permit requesting permission to develop some of his protected 
wetlands could be required by the city to dedicate a large portion of the re-
maining undeveloped land to the city as a conservation easement in order to 
offset the potential harms resulting from the new development.1 
Government deals with private owners are called exactions.2 Put simp-
ly, exactions are conditions that local governments may require of property 
owners in return for the grant of permits that allow the intensified use of real 
property.3 Common examples are “mandatory dedications of land, fees re-
quired in lieu of dedication, and impact fees given by property owners in 
exchange for permits, zoning changes, and other regulatory clearances.”4 
While landowners might view exactions as a hindrance to development, they 
are essential tools for municipalities seeking to protect the public interest by 
guiding development in a certain direction when granting land use permits.5 
Exactions law developed out of two constitutional concepts: the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause and the principle of unconstitutional condi-
tions.6 The Takings Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for 
 
 1. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 2. See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the 
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 611 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Takings 
Formalism]. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. at 613. 
 5. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 
512–13 (2012) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future]. 
 6. See generally, Julie A. Tappendorf & Mattew T. DiCianni, The Big Chill? — The 
Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local Government/Developer Relationship, 30 TOURO L. 
REV. 455 (2014) [hereinafter Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today] (providing an 
overview of the development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Robert Meltz, 
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public use, without just compensation.”7 The Supreme Court of the United 
States interpreted this to mean that the government, using its police power, 
may appropriate private property for the health, safety, and welfare of the 
public, so long as it provides just compensation for the property taken.8 Un-
til the early twentieth century, the Court recognized only two types of tak-
ings: (1) a formal appropriation of property and (2) a permanent physical 
invasion of property.9 In 1922, the Court handed down a decision in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon10 that gave birth to the notion of “regulatory 
takings.”11 The Court held that when a government regulation of land use 
goes “too far,” a taking might result despite the absence of formal appropria-
tion or physical invasion.12 In the late twentieth century, beginning with 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,13 the Court began 
setting forth guidelines for determining how far is “too far,” and which regu-
lations affect a taking and thus require just compensation.14 
Exactions are a subset of takings jurisprudence in that most of the cases 
arise because a local government has placed limits on how a person may use 
his property via a condition that must be fulfilled before the permit for the 
use is granted.15 However, unlike the deferential Penn Central balancing test 
most regulatory takings claims receive,16 exactions are reviewed under a 
rule-formalist heightened scrutiny.17 
 
Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 328 (2007) (provid-
ing an overview of the development of takings jurisprudence). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946). 
 9. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 328. 
 10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 11. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 328. 
 12. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 14. The factors in Penn Central include: (1) the character of the government action 
restricting the claimant’s property rights; (2) the economic impact of the regulation; and (3) 
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expecta-
tions. Id. at 124. For a more thorough discussion of takings jurisprudence, see Meltz, supra 
note 6. 
 15. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 614. For a brief explanation of 
regulations in Koontz, see BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE 
LAW & LITIGATION § 3:31 (2014 ed.). 
 16. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 612. 
 17. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–36 (1987); infra Part II.B. The “essential nexus” and “rough 
proportionality” tests of Nollan and Dolan require courts to consider a “prescribed, focused 
logic” when examining exactions. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 611, 629. 
“Thus, the test differ[s] strikingly from the . . . open-ended inquiry of Penn Central.” See id. 
at 629. 
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The idea of “unconstitutional conditions” was introduced in 1910 in 
two Supreme Court cases.18 The doctrine “forbids burdening the Constitu-
tion’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who 
exercise them.”19 Thus, the government may not condition the receipt of a 
discretionary benefit on the recipient’s relinquishment of a constitutionally 
protected right.20 While the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions evolved 
over the course of the twentieth century, the Court did not use it to regulate 
exactions until the latter part of the century.21 As exactions require landown-
ers to forfeit the constitutionally protected right to use their property in 
whatever way they see fit in exchange for permits, unconstitutional condi-
tions was the “logical underpinning” for the Court to use in developing ex-
actions jurisprudence.22 
Theoretically, the purpose behind exactions is to put the burden of mit-
igating harm that may result from intensified land use on the person propos-
ing the intensified use.23 Until recently, however, municipal governments 
had little regulation concerning how they could use these exactions.24 If a 
developer wanted to build a new shopping center, the city could require him 
to dedicate part of the land as a street right-of-way.25 Or a business owner 
might request that the city rezone an area so that the business sits in a com-
mercial zone rather than residential; the city will grant the permit, as long as 
he also dedicates a parcel of his property to the city for use in future high-
way expansion.26 
During its efforts to delineate the standards for takings jurisprudence it 
had established in the late 1900s, the Supreme Court began to limit the way 
 
 18. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 51 (1910) (White, J., 
concurring); Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56, 69–70 (1910) (White, J., 
concurring). 
 19. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013). 
 20. Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today, supra note 6, at 456. Tappendorf and 
DiCianni provided an example of a television station’s receipt of government funding: “the 
government cannot force a television station receiving public funds to refrain from endorsing 
a candidate for public office because then the constitutionally protected right (freedom of 
speech) would be impermissibly burdened by the government’s refusal to provide public 
funds to the television station.” Id. at 456–57. 
 21. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 407; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 859; Tappendorf & DiCianni, Tak-
ings Law Today, supra note 6, at 458. 
 22. Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today, supra note 6, at 458. 
 23. See, e.g., Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 516; Fenster, Takings 
Formalism, supra note 2, at 613. 
 24. See J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Fed-
eral Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 374–76 (2002). 
 25. See City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 368–69, 837 S.W.2d 286, 287 
(1992). 
 26. See Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 307 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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local government could require exactions.27 In Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission28 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,29 the Court set out a two-pronged 
test to determine if an exaction violated the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions to rise to the level of a taking under the Fifth Amendment pur-
poses.30 First, per Nollan, exactions must bear an “essential nexus” to the 
harm prevented,31 and second, per Dolan, the condition imposed must be 
roughly proportional to the adverse impact of the project on the communi-
ty.32 
After these landmark cases, municipalities still had some leeway when 
granting land use permits.33 There were two primary methods to get around 
the test.34 First, local governments could require the owner to pay a mone-
tary exaction, or pay toward the costs of mitigating any perceived harms, 
rather than granting an actual portion of his or her land.35 Second, local gov-
ernments would simply deny the permit should the landowner refuse the 
condition attached; thus the exaction escapes the scrutiny of the 
Nollan/Dolan test.36 This note focuses on the latter. 
In its June 2013 decision of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Manage-
ment District,37 the Supreme Court held that both monetary exactions and 
failed exactions are subject to the Nollan/Dolan rough proportionality test.38 
This decision in Koontz creates more questions than it resolves. While os-
tensibly expanding the individual rights of property owners, the decision 
may have an adverse impact on community growth as it limits and confuses 
local government control over the granting of land use permits. This article 
proposes that, in order to prevent adverse effects on community develop-
ment, regulation of government exactions is better left to state legislatures 
and administrative review boards. 
Part II of this note provides a brief history of how exactions have af-
fected city development up to current times, and then describes Nollan, Do-
lan, and Koontz. Part III discusses some of the ramifications of the Koontz 
decision on city growth and development, looks into the confusion Koontz 
 
 27. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 28. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 29. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 30. See id. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 31. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 32. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 33. See Breemer, supra note 24, at 375. 
 34. See id.; Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012). 
 35. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 624. 
 36. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 
(1999). See also Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 624. 
 37. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 38. Id. at 2595, 2599. 
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will cause in future litigation, and then provides a better method of examin-
ing exactions, that is, through state legislatures and administrative review 
boards. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Exactions 
Exactions arose in the early nineteenth century as a municipal effort to 
force rogue developers into taking responsibility for the societal harms their 
developments caused.39 To develop land in the decades leading up to the 
1930s, a developer needed only “a whim, a pen, and a map.”40 This led to an 
overabundance of developed lots without amenities such as utility services 
or roads, which naturally no one wanted, and thus led to an abundance of 
vacant lots and tax delinquency on the part of the developers.41 This caused 
sporadic and disorderly growth, as no developers wished to continue work 
on this “dead land” property that was essentially uninhabitable and would 
simply move further out of town to develop again.42 
The Standard Planning Enabling Act of 1928 sought to remedy the 
problem by recommending that municipalities condition permit approval 
upon the developer providing essential necessities.43 The city could require 
the developer to build “streets, water mains, sewer lines, and other utility 
structures” in order to cope with the increased population and its impact in 
the subdivision and surrounding area.44 Thus, the institutionalized govern-
ment exaction was born.45 These original exactions mostly required “direct 
infrastructural enhancement”—meaning they focused on mitigating impacts 
that the developer could remedy on the developed land itself such as provid-
ing drainage systems, sidewalks, or road improvements in the developed 
area.46 During and following the Great Depression, developers and the real 
estate community challenged these conditional requirements as they became 
 
 39. See ALVIN L. ARNOLD & MARSHALL E. TRACHT, 1 CONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCING § 2:82 (3d ed. 2013). 
 40. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 516. 
 41. R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Bene-
fit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5–6 (1987). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 517. 
 44. See id.; Jennifer Evans-Cowley, Development Exactions: Process and Planning 
Issues, at 3 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper WP06JEC1, 2006). 
 45. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 517. 
 46. Id. 
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a burden during the economic downturn, but they never gained sympathy in 
court.47 
By the 1940s, conditioning permit approval upon on-site, harm-
mitigating requirements had become the norm in most cities.48 Following 
World War II, local governments began imposing off-site requirements to 
mitigate the harm that came with the “mass suburbanization” of the 1950s.49 
These external exactions might require the developer to contribute, either 
directly by providing labor and materials or financially through a monetary 
exaction, to “wastewater facilities, schools, public parks, precinct houses, 
fire stations, or even day care services,” services to which their development 
had no connection.50 
Naturally, developers fought these off-site, external exactions, arguing 
that they were “inequit[able], inefficien[t], and general[ly] ineffective[] in 
what they saw as a piecemeal, ad hoc land use permitting process.”51 The 
general public, however, found exactions to be preferable to the other option 
of increasing local taxes to pay for these public projects.52 By the latter part 
of the twentieth century, exactions had become a standard tool wielded by 
local governments when issuing approvals for land use, especially in areas 
with fast-growing populations.53 This time developers gained some traction 
when they brought suit challenging the conditions, usually in the form of 
state laws or state supreme court decisions imposing small limitations on 
municipalities.54 A common trend among states was to impose a “reasonable 
relationship” test that weighed the burdens and benefits to the developer.55 
 
 47. See, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928) (holding devel-
oper required to provide subdivision street dedications); Mefford v. City of Tulare, 228 P.2d 
847 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (ruling developer required to provide sewers); Brous v. Smith, 
106 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1952) (holding developer required to provide roadway improvements); 
Petterson v. City of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1956) (ruling developer required to 
provide gutters and curbs). 
 48. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518. 
 49. Id.; see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (holding that the state’s police 
power for takings may be used to make communities beautiful and desirable, and not solely 
for public health, safety, and morality purposes). 
 50. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518; see also Evans-Cowley, 
supra note 44, at 3. 
 51. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518. 
 52. See Evans-Cowley, supra note 44, at 3. 
 53. See Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institu-
tional Context of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 734 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Regulat-
ing Land Use]. 
 54. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518–19. 
 55. See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976) (holding there 
must be “a reasonable relationship between the approval of the subdivision and the munici-
pality’s need for land”); Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980) (stating 
that the test is “whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use 
to which the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property 
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Exactions have become an essential tool for municipalities when mak-
ing long-range development plans and have extended beyond simple land 
dedication or utility easements.56 Monetary exactions, or cash payments, 
have become another way of mitigating potential harm caused by height-
ened land use.57 These methods became an alternative to dedications of land 
or other physical exactions when those traditional exactions were “incon-
venient, too small, or otherwise did not account for the perceived needs of 
the development.”58 The “mitigation fees” or “impact fees” can be imposed 
by a local government as a condition to approving a development permit or 
some other land use action, such as rezoning.59 Monetary exactions have 
become useful tools for municipalities to supplement both state and federal 
subsidies to local governments and in preventing tax increases as an alterna-
tive.60 Until recently, municipalities had discretion to impose either land 
dedication or monetary exactions as needed.61 
B. The Supreme Court Takes Action in Nollan and Dolan 
Starting in 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States began placing 
limits on exactions used by municipalities.62 In two landmark cases, Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court 
developed a two-part test to determine if the exaction imposed by the city 
 
simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or 
permit”); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) (holding 
that to be valid, the exaction must “be ‘substantially related’ to the health, safety, or general 
welfare of the people . . . [and] be reasonable”); Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 
(Utah 1979) (ruling that “the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the 
needs created by the subdivision”); Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 
(Wis. 1965) (holding that “[t]he test of reasonableness is always applicable to any attempt to 
exercise the police power”). 
 56. See, e.g., Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 734; Mulvaney, Exactions 
for the Future, supra note 5, at 518–19. 
 57. See Lauren Reznick, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitution-
ality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 737 
(2007). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.; see also Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (discuss-
ing the City’s requirement that a developer pay a “mitigation fee” as a condition for approval 
of a rezoning permit). 
 60. See Reznick, supra note 57, at 738. For further discussion on the impacts of exac-
tions on public tax policy, see Evans-Cowley, supra note 44. 
 61. See, e.g., Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 734; Breemer, supra note 
24, at 375. 
 62. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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had gone past a mere exaction to become a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.63 
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and an “Essential Nex-
us” 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Nollans sought to 
convert an oceanfront cottage into a three-bedroom home, which would 
have blocked the public’s view of the ocean.64 The California Coastal Com-
mission approved the permit on condition that the Nollans provide a public 
walking easement along the ocean in front of the property, which would 
have resulted in a permanent dedication of part of their property.65 The 
Nollans lost in state court and eventually brought their appeal to the Su-
preme Court.66 
The Court determined that the easement dedication did not, and could 
never, alleviate the immediate developmental impact of expanding the 
home.67 It held that in order for an exaction to pass constitutional muster, the 
government agency must prove that it bears an “essential nexus” to the im-
pacts caused by the development requested.68 Without that essential nexus, 
the Court likened the situation to a “California law forb[idding] shouting fire 
in a crowded theater, but grant[ing] dispensations to those willing to con-
tribute $100 to the state treasury.”69 In short, the Court stated, “unless the 
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development 
ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-
and-out plan of extortion.’”70 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out several problems with the 
Court’s analysis, noting first that the easement attached to the permit did in 
fact respond to the specific burden placed on the public in granting the 
Nollans’s permit.71 He also noted that the Commission’s action did not im-
 
 63. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374. 
 64. Nollan, 483 U.S at 827–30. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 838. 
 68. Id. at 836–37. 
 69. Id. at 837. 
 70. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–
15 (N.H. 1981)). 
 71. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[The Commission] has determined that the 
Nollans’ burden on access would be offset by a deed restriction that formalizes the public’s 
right to pass along the shore. In its informed judgment, such a tradeoff would preserve the net 
amount of public access to the coastline. The Court’s insistence on a precise fit between the 
forms of burden and condition on each individual parcel along the California coast would 
penalize the Commission for its flexibility, hampering the ability to fulfill its public trust 
mandate.”). 
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plicate any constitutional concerns under the takings clause, specifically the 
economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which it interferes with 
investment-backed expectations.72 
2.  Dolan v. City of Tigard and Rough Proportionality 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, Ms. Dolan requested a permit to expand her 
plumbing and electrical supply store and pave over a gravel parking lot 
along a creek.73 The Tigard City Planning Commission approved the permit 
upon the condition that she dedicate a strip of her land to the city for flood-
plain management and a bicycle path.74 Once again, Ms. Dolan lost all state 
court appeals.75 
Dolan was the first case in which the Court explicitly used unconstitu-
tional conditions to rule on land use exactions, although it stated that the 
holding in Nollan was an application of the doctrine.76 The Court stated that 
the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—
here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a pub-
lic use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the govern-
ment where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.77 
Rejecting the “reasonably related” standard most state courts had used,78 the 
Court held: 
[A] term such as “rough proportionality” best encapsulates what we hold 
to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical 
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individual-
ized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.
79
 
These cases left two unresolved questions for city planning commis-
sions: (1) whether a monetary exaction is subject to the Nollan/Dolan test 
and (2) whether a failed exaction, where a permit is denied before a condi-
tion is attached, is subject to Nollan and Dolan.80 
 
 72. Id. at 853–57 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978)). Notably, Justice Brennan would have the Court apply the less rigorous Penn Central 
test already in place for regulating takings rather than create a new standard for exactions. 
 73. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–83 (1994). 
 74. Id. at 379–80. 
 75. Id. at 382–83. 
 76. Id. at 385. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See supra note 55. 
 79. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 80. Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 624. 
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C.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 
(2013) 
In spring 2013, the Court answered these two questions in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District.81 Mr. Koontz sought a permit from 
St. Johns River Water Management District (“the District”) to develop part 
of his property, which, consistent with Florida law, requires permit appli-
cants wishing to build on wetlands to offset the resulting environmental 
damage.82 Mr. Koontz offered to mitigate the environmental effects of his 
development proposal by deeding to the District a conservation easement on 
nearly three-quarters of his property, the entire portion that he did not plan 
to develop.83 
The District rejected Mr. Koontz’s proposal, however, and gave him 
the option of choosing between: (1) reducing the size of his development 
and, inter alia, deeding to the District a conservation easement on the result-
ing larger remainder of his property, or (2) hiring contractors to improve 
District-owned wetlands several miles away.84 Believing the District’s de-
mands to be excessive in light of the environmental effects his proposal 
would have caused, Mr. Koontz filed suit under a state law that provides 
money damages for agency action that is an “unreasonable exercise of the 
state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.”85 Both 
the trial and appellate courts found that the District’s actions violated Nollan 
and Dolan and therefore constituted a taking, but the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida reversed and held that Mr. Koontz did not have a claim because the 
Nollan/Dolan test did not apply to applications for permits or to monetary 
exactions.86 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court determined that Mr. 
Koontz’s property had in fact been taken per the Fifth Amendment.87 The 
Court again used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to state that the 
government could not coerce people into giving up certain rights.88 Nollan 
and Dolan “‘involve a special application’ of this doctrine that protects the 
Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for property the government 
takes when owners apply for land use permits.”89 Notably, the Court held 
 
 81. See 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 82. Id. at 2591–94. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2593. 
 85. Id. 
 86. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 87. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 88. Id. at 2595. 
 89. Id. at 2594 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005); Do-
lan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). 
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that “the principles that undergird the decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not 
change depending on whether the government approves a permit on the 
condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit because 
the applicant refuses to do so.”90 The Court purported to recognize that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s 
enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from the people who 
exercise those rights, regardless of whether the government ultimately suc-
ceeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting those rights.91 
The District argued that it was allowed to deny Mr. Koontz’s applica-
tion outright with no option to pay for the improvements mentioned without 
violating the Constitution, but the Court declared it made no difference.92 
The Court recognized that this may cause a problem when deciding what 
remedy to provide: the Fifth Amendment states that the remedy for an un-
constitutional taking is just compensation, but when a permit is denied be-
fore a condition is attached, nothing has been taken.93 The Court, however, 
failed to resolve this problem, remanding the case back to Florida and leav-
ing the question of what remedy to provide to the lower court.94 Ultimately, 
the Court held that: (1) a local government’s demand for property from a 
land use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements, even 
when it denies the permit, and (2) a local government’s demand for money 
from a land use applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements.95 
In her dissent, Justice Kagan expressed concerns about the Court’s role 
in this decision, stating: 
The majority turns a broad array of local land use regulations into federal 
constitutional questions. It deprives the state and local governments of 
the flexibility they need to enhance their communities—to ensure envi-
ronmentally sound and economically productive development. It places 




As Justice Kagan stated, the Court effectively curtailed all local gov-
erning power to regulate land use in a manner practicable to each municipal-
ity’s specific needs by forcing its holding into the conditional permit pro-
cess, which is a distinctly local issue.97 This decision will lead to ramifica-
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2596. 
 93. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2599, 2603. 
 96. Id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Kagan’s dissent primarily fo-
cused on the majority’s holding that monetary exactions are subject to Nollan and Dolan, her 
analysis applies likewise to permit denials. 
 97. Id. at 2607. 
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tions in city development not intended by the Court and provides an un-
workable standard for lower courts hearing disputes. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A.  Unintended Ramifications in City Development 
Requiring city planning agencies to examine proposed conditions in the 
light of Nollan’s “rough proportionality” and Dolan’s “essential nexus” will 
cause a detrimental effect on land use negotiations, which will lead to unde-
sirable results in city development.98 Municipalities will forgo negotiations 
altogether, resulting in outright denials, over-regulation, or no develop-
ment;99 or municipalities will approve permits with significantly less strin-
gent conditions attached, leading to under-regulation and mass chaos in de-
velopment.100 
1. The Effect on Conditional Permit Negotiations 
The Court’s decision in Koontz appears initially to create a manageable 
way of preventing “extortionate” demands from local land use agencies.101 It 
allows landowners to bring suit challenging those demands rather than face 
a permit denial after extended negotiations.102 At first glance, it seems logi-
cal to allow a developer whose permit is denied because he stood in the face 
of an extortionate request and refused to cave to an inappropriate exaction to 
avail himself of Nollan and Dolan, just as one who submits to the demand 
 
 98. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 654–68. 
 99. Id. at 661–65. Because of the litigation risks involved in negotiating with landown-
ers over a mitigating condition, local governments may simply deny proposals outright rather 
than impose necessary exactions that Koontz has made “vulnerable to constitutional challeng-
es. . . . Even when a developer or property owner would willingly choose an expensive condi-
tion over an outright denial, the burdens and risks imposed by the nexus and proportionality 
tests can keep local governments from offering such conditions.” Id. at 662. 
 100. Id. at 654–61. Communities are often caught in between two potential litigants: that 
of property owners wishing to expand, and political interest groups who oppose either specif-
ic plans or development in general. Id. In light of Koontz, property owners can now come to 
court armed with their constitutional rights, a “powerful weapon” that third party litigants 
cannot raise, regardless of whether the local government has finalized the condition or if it has 
merely suggested a starting point from which further negotiations will follow. See id. 
 101. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 
300 (2011), [hereinafter Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions]. 
 102. See id. Prior to Koontz, the only remedy for a developer whose permit had been 
denied was to argue an unconstitutional taking under the more deferential Penn Central test. 
Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 617. The only way to have access to the height-
ened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan was to agree to the exaction, allow it to attach to the per-
mit, and then challenge it in court. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 
301. 
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and allows the condition to attach to the permit can.103 In practice, however, 
the decision in Koontz is likely to have a cooling effect on compromise ne-
gotiations between landowners and land use agencies, which will ultimately 
hurt both developers and the general public as well as invite baseless litiga-
tion in federal court over a local issue.104 
It is common practice for land use agencies and developers to negotiate 
a compromise during the application approval process.105 Subjecting an ex-
action to the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test at the moment it is 
proposed, however, could foreclose the possibility of such a negotiating 
session ever taking place.106 Koontz dictates that governmental land use 
agencies face a constitutional challenge in federal court if they simply enter 
negotiations with an offer that the landowner views as extortionate, a chal-
lenge that many communities are ill-equipped to face.107 This potential lia-
bility will cause these agencies to deny permit applications outright rather 
than enter risky negotiations for which they could be held to the 
Nollan/Dolan standard.108 Thus, city-planning commissions will be reluctant 
to even consider negotiations with developers to reach a satisfactory ex-
change.109 
Alternatively, now that the negotiations themselves rather than the final 
deal must be roughly proportional and bear an essential nexus to the antici-
pated harm, local governments may simply refuse to enter negotiations and 
force the developer to offer “sweeteners” such as “workforce housing, over-
sized water and sewer pipes, [or] community recreational facilities,” in order 
to obtain expansion permits.110 
 
 103. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301. 
 104. See id. Justice Kagan, in her Koontz dissent, stated that by applying Nolan and 
Dollan to permit conditions, “the majority extends the Takings Clause, with its notoriously 
‘difficult’ and ‘perplexing’ standards, into the very heart of local land use regulation and 
service delivery.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998)). Again, Justice 
Kagan’s reference to the Court’s holding regarding monetary exactions is equally applicable 
to permit denials. See id. 
 105. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 308. 
 106. Id.; see, e.g., Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644. 
 107. Mulvaney, Propsed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–02; see also Amicus Brief at 
12–13, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 
11-1447), 2012 WL 6755147, at *12–13 (“Applying Nollan and Dolan beyond the context of 
actual exactions would lead to more intrusive and frequent legal challenges to land use deci-
sions, undermining local governments’ capacity to carry out their planning and regulatory 
responsibilities.”). 
 108. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–02. 
 109. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644; David L. Callies, Koontz 
Redux: Where We Are and What’s Left, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. LAW 7 (2013). 
 110. Callies, supra note 109, at 7.  
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By forcing unapproved permits into the Nollan/Dolan test, many city 
planning organizations, formerly willing to discuss possible conditions that 
could alleviate both parties’ concerns, will simply deny permits without 
even entering negotiations in order to face the lesser standard of the Penn 
Central test rather than the heightened scrutiny Koontz requires should a 
lawsuit arise.111 This will naturally lead to stagnated development, especially 
in smaller areas that are seeking economic as well as physical growth, but 
may not have the resources to fight large-scale battles in court. There are 
many reasons for a municipality to deny a land use permit,112 and exactions 
are necessary tools that give local land use agencies the flexibility they need 
to protect public health and safety and promote development schemes for 
the general welfare.113 
On the other hand, rather than denying applications outright, local land 
use agencies may begin to simply forgo placing conditions on land use ap-
plications altogether, which could result in massive harm to the general pub-
lic.114 The exaction system was created to regulate development that serves 
the interests of both the developer and the public, but this system could now 
ultimately have the opposite effect by allowing unregulated development.115 
This creates the worst possible result: local land use agencies will be unable 
to negotiate adequate, workable mitigation compromises with developers; 
developers will be denied conditional permit approvals from wary agencies; 
and the entire regulatory process will become more rigid and mechanical, 
resulting in more denials and fewer negotiated compromises to serve local 
and developer interests.116 Nobody wins. 
 
 111. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644. 
 112. City regulations regarding land use are not “components of a permanent, fixed 
scheme,” but rather “a negotiable set of parameters” used to create “relationships with prop-
erty owners seeking to change the use of their property.” Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra 
note 2, at 623. The negotiation process is essential to this development scheme, as is the 
necessity that some permits be denied. See id.; Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 
101, at 303–04. 
 113. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONS 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 189, 214–15 (2010) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Remnants]. 
 114. See, e.g., Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 308–09. Likewise, 
under-regulation leads to windfalls on the part of the landowner at the expense of the public. 
Id. at 308 n.160. But see Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exac-
tions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000). 
 115. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 308–09; Mulvaney, Rem-
nants, supra note 113, at 214–15. 
 116. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644; ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 
39, at § 2:82. 
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2.  The Effect on City Development 
Not only will requiring land use permits to meet the Nollan/Dolan 
standard before they are approved result in fewer negotiated compromises 
between land use regulators and landowners, reaching long-term goals will 
be much more difficult for cities.117 Land use planning allows cities to guide 
development by limiting the type and degree of allowable intensified use of 
property and zoning.118 It usually reflects a municipality’s “long-term de-
sign, economic conditions, geography, and environmental resources.”119 
Thus, exactions are generally in line with the land use policies of the com-
munity and are part of planning processes that broadly assess local needs 
and objectives.120 
By using exactions to reach these community goals, local governments 
are able to shift the costs of a proposed project’s negative impacts from the 
general public (in the form of taxes) to the developer who is ultimately re-
sponsible for causing the harm.121 In this way, local government can regulate 
and limit land use development for the general welfare without imposing 
additional costs.122 Thus, exactions have become key regulatory tools in a 
narrow, local environment where elected and appointed officials can wield 
their power to further the interests of the community in land development.123 
By requiring that an exaction fit the Nollan/Dolan test at its inception, 
however, the Court in Koontz has created “a near per se rule against using 
exactions for the future” as an effort to prevent or control certain types of 
city development.124 When a city is imposing exactions that fit a broad, fu-
ture plan, it is almost impossible for it to demonstrate that the exaction bears 
an essential nexus or is roughly proportional to the development proposed.125 
 
 117. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 529; see also Amicus Brief at 
4–5, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447), 
2012 WL 6759407, at *4–5 (“Each day in countless communities across the country, land use 
planning and zoning officials negotiate with developers over permit conditions that promote 
responsible development—including, as in this case, conditions that mitigate related envi-
ronmental harms. These negotiations typically end with agreed-upon conditions, tailored to 
each unique proposal, that allow development to go forward, while also providing mitigating 
benefits to account for the very real costs development can impose upon the community at 
large.”). 
 118. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 529. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., id. at 536, 540–41; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 623. 
 121. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 542. 
 125. See, e.g., id.; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 615 (“Rather, the Court’s 
efforts to describe and prescribe exactions so misunderstand the complicated dynamics of 
land use regulation that they result in variable and unfortunate consequences—including, 
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There is necessarily some uncertainty when developing a long-term city 
plan, and local governments need flexibility when placing conditions on 
permits in order to achieve these goals.126 
By placing unapproved conditional permits under the scrutiny of 
Nollan and Dolan, the only exactions that will pass constitutional muster are 
those with harms that are easily defined and quantified at the instant of per-
mit approval.127 Thus, nebulous yet necessary city planning benefits such as 
“traffic-reducing rights-of-way and safety-inducing shore protection 
measures” may never happen, and the impacts of intensified land use will go 
unmitigated.128 Before Koontz, courts routinely deferred to local governmen-
tal planning efforts in regulatory takings disputes because they recognized 
that imposing exactions with a broad, comprehensive plan in mind is less 
likely to be extortionate than when the exaction is imposed in a targeted way 
toward a particular developer.129 After Koontz, lower courts no longer have 
that discretion, and city development will suffer for it. 
B. An Impossible Standard 
When a land use agency denies a permit before a condition has at-
tached, no property has been taken. The landowner might argue that his 
right to use the property in the manner in which he wishes has been taken, 
but this is not a takings claim; government infringement on personal rights 
sounds in due process and would be best resolved with a due process stand-
ard.130 The Court’s insistence on a takings analysis leads to a confusing 
standard that lower courts will have difficulty applying in local contexts 
 
ironically, diminished property rights for landowners. Local context, in other words, often 
frustrates and complicates constitutional rules.”). 
 126. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 542; see also Amicus Brief at 
14, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447) 2012 
WL 6755147, at *14 (“Petitioner’s proposal also would have perverse, harmful consequences 
for property owners seeking to develop their property for profit. Conditions attached to de-
velopment authorizations often provide an effective and relatively inexpensive way of ad-
dressing the negative externalities associated with development. Thus, exactions and other 
conditions attached to development approvals often produce ‘win-win solutions’ that allow 
developers to achieve all or most of their development objectives while addressing the legit-
imate concerns of public officials and their constituents about the adverse effects of devel-
opment.”). 
 127. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 542. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 530; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 611–12. 
 130. For a discussion of how the Due Process Clause is meant to encompass broader 
rights than the simple taking of property, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitu-
tional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 984 (2000). See also Amicus Brief at 28, Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6771846, at 
*28. 
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because cities develop plans to meet their specific needs, often without con-
sidering the large-scale constitutional implications that may arise should a 
property owner challenge that plan.131 
1.  Are Exactions Examined Under Takings or Due Process? 
Exactions are designed to prevent an immediately-obvious potential 
harm.132 When this is the case, Nollan and Dolan fall easily into place be-
cause the exaction attached to the permit, intended to mitigate the potential 
harm of the development, will only be allowed if it is linked both qualita-
tively (bearing an essential nexus) and quantitatively (roughly proportional) 
to this potential harm.133 Thus, under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 
the condition attached to the permit was an actual physical taking of identi-
fiable property.134 In both Nollan and Dolan, the plaintiffs lost the right to 
exclude members of the public from their property.135 Without question, 
these conditions would require compensation if they had not been imposed 
within the context of exactions.136 When a condition fails before it is ap-
proved, however, no identifiable property has been lost.137 According to the 
Court, there is no difference between a condition attached before or after 
approval; in each situation, a local government has conditioned approval of 
a land use permit on an unconstitutional condition.138 But whether a condi-
tion has attached prior to approval, meaning definite property has attached 
to the application, is critical to determining the condition’s constitutionali-
ty.139 
 
 131. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 615–16. 
 132. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 521. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987). 
 135. Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; see also ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 
39 at § 2:82. 
 136. The right to intensified land use is the “just compensation” for an exactions taking. 
See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639. 
 137. Id. at 639–40; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) 
(ruling that in order to challenge a regulation as a taking, the plaintiff may only assert: 1) a 
physical taking; 2) a total regulatory taking; 3) a Penn Central taking; or 4) an exaction that 
violates Nollan and Dolan). 
 138. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013); 
Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000); Fenster, Failed Ex-
actions, supra note 34, at 639–40. 
 139. Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40. An amicus brief submitted in 
Koontz provides a helpful comparison: “[T]here is all the difference in the world between 
when government contemplates taking some action and when it actually takes that action. A 
citizen may ponder trespassing on his or her neighbor’s land but such an unneighborly 
thought is different as a matter of law from an actual trespass.” Amicus Brief at 14, Koontz v. 
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A court can only know what property will be taken after the land use 
regulator has identified the specific exaction required for permit approval.140 
The Fifth Amendment states “private property [shall not] be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”141 When an exaction fails before it is ap-
proved  no “private property” has been taken for “public use.”142 Unlike in 
Nollan and Dolan, in Koontz, the District did not specifically identify the 
property to be taken in exchange for Mr. Koontz’s permit approval; instead, 
the permit had been denied.143 Even if the District’s actions were extortion-
ate or unreasonable, Mr. Koontz’s property had not been taken for Fifth 
Amendment purposes.144 Constitutionally, Mr. Koontz’s claim sounded in 
due process, not takings.145 The Supreme Court of Florida recognized this 
distinction in refusing to expand Nollan and Dolan when it heard Mr. 
Koontz’s case.146 
Justice Kagan recognized the flaws in the Court’s overruling of the 
Florida decision, not only in the confusing application of the Takings Clause 
to property that had not been taken, but also in applying the same standard 
to both real property dedication and monetary exactions.147 As highlighted in 
Koontz, exactions law falls into its own category of regulatory takings, 
which, by virtue of the way it operates, creates confusion.148 
2. Exactions Are Considered Under a Special Standard 
The Nollan/Dolan test only applies to a narrow category of land use 
law: exactions cases.149 This unique framework exclusive to exactions has 
resulted in legal confusion since the landmark cases were decided.150 First of 
all, the standard places a greater burden on land use agencies to defend the 
condition attached to a permit than it does in justifying the regulations that 
 
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447) 2012 WL 6755147, 
at *8. 
 140. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40. 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 142. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40. 
 143. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 
34, at 639–40. 
 144. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40. 
 145. See id. 
 146. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), reh’g 
denied (Jan. 4, 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012), and rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 147. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 148. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 149. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); BLAESSER & 
WIENSTEIN, supra note 15, at § 3:31; Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 277–
78. 
 150. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 277–78. 
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allow the agencies to require a permit for expansion in the first place.151 
Secondly, there is so much confusion about when and where the standard 
applies that agencies and developers alike are unable to rely on its applica-
tion in any given scenario.152 Koontz, then, was the Court’s effort to deline-
ate and define the standard,153 but clearly further efforts are needed. 
Before Koontz, when a local land use regulator chose to deny a permit 
rather than condition approval on an exaction, courts hearing the case would 
apply the traditional regulatory takings standard from Penn Central.154 
When the government attached a condition, however, courts would apply 
the intermediate scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.155 This heightened scrutiny 
allows courts to ensure that the condition bears a reasonable relationship to 
the government’s purpose in attaching the condition.156 Exactions law, then, 
though ostensibly falling into the category of takings law, currently bears 
more of a resemblance to a due process claim.157 
In Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A.,158 the Court made an attempt to reconcile 
takings law with exactions law.159 The Court’s exactions decisions, accord-
ing to the Court in Lingle, are no more than a check on government efforts 
to impose the functional equivalent of a taking of property via a regulatory 
act without compensation.160 
3. The Courts’ Role in Exactions Disputes 
As Justice Kagan stated, the Koontz decision inserts the judiciary into 
the “very heart” of local governance.161 Exactions law was fairly adequately 
regulated prior to the Court’s involvement in Nollan and Dolan, whether 
through state court decisions or state statutes.162 The state court decisions 
regulated exactions by holding either that the local government did not have 
the authority to place certain conditions on development or by holding the 
 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 15, at § 3:31. 
 154. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 641. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 731. 
 157. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 15, at § 3:31; see also Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608–09 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Finally, a court 
can use the Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in many places) state law 
to protect against monetary demands, whether or not imposed to evade Nollan and Dolan, 
that simply ‘go[] too far.’”) (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). 
 158. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 159. Id.; Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 731. 
 160. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528; Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 731. 
 161. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 162. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735–36; see also Mulvaney, 
Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 12. 
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condition unconstitutional per the state constitution.163 State legislation 
might allow exactions but would place limitations on them.164 
As stated earlier, by placing failed exactions into takings jurisprudence, 
state courts are left with an unworkable standard.165 Because no condition 
has been attached to the permit, courts will be forced to engage in “judicial 
speculation on hypothetical exactions and their hypothetical impacts” in 
order to review these cases that may or may not present an actual controver-
sy.166 Additionally, once the land use agency denies a permit, the developer 
is left with the same rights that he had before he applied, that is, the right to 
the un-intensified use of his property.167 He therefore has not forfeited any-
thing; nothing was taken.168 Thus, because nothing has been identified as 
taken, a court is unable to determine if the permit denial violates the takings 
tests provided in Nollan and Dolan.169 The court can only provide the desig-
nated remedy of just compensation if the permit denial violates the 
Nollan/Dolan test.170 Assuming this remedy is appropriate, the public should 
then be entitled to gain the property the court awarded just compensation 
for, as just compensation is only provided for property taken for public 
use.171 If a court awards just compensation for a failed exaction, there is 
nothing for the public to receive.172 
The courts’ role, then, is especially called into question when awarding 
remedies.173 It is impossible to determine just compensation when nothing 
has been taken.174 The remedies outlined in Nollan and Dolan only make 
sense when actual, identifiable property or a property interest is taken fol-
 
 163. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., Inc., 355 So. 2d 363, 364–65 
(Ala. 1978) (invalidating as beyond statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of park land 
dedication); Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108, 111 (Or. 1961) (invalidating fee imposed on 
residential developers in lieu of park land dedication because failure of ordinance to limit use 
of funds to benefit made the fee a tax, which the county had no statutory authority to im-
pose); Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735–36. 
 164. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735–36. 
 165. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–02. 
 166. Id. at 301. 
 167. Id. at 302. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 302–03. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–03. The Florida District 
Court Judge used slightly more colorful terms: “[I]n what parallel legal universe or deep 
chamber of Wonderland’s rabbit hole could there be a right to just compensation for the 
taking of property under the Fifth Amendment when no property of any kind was ever taken 
by the government and none ever given up by the owner?” St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. 
v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 172. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 302. 
 173. See, e.g., ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 39, at § 2:82. 
 174. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013). 
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lowing a negotiation with a land use regulatory agency.175 Extortionate de-
mands might warrant a constitutional remedy, but this remedy must flow 
from another source of law.176 
C. A Better Method: Local Governments Are in a Better Position to Regu-
late 
These issues raise concerns about the role of courts in resolving dis-
putes between landowners and local government. Resolving land use disa-
greements in court leaves parties tied up in the lengthy litigation process 
while community growth and development stagnates.177 Likewise, court 
decisions result in inconsistent and arbitrary standards concerning land use 
regulation, as seen in Koontz.178 Solutions to these problems are better left to 
the branches of government capable of applying local rather than national 
standards, either in the form of a state legislature or an executive agency. 
Unlike lawsuits, which can tie parties up in litigation for many years 
and provide untenable results that leave everybody unhappy, state legisla-
tures and municipal agencies know local needs and plans and have the pow-
er to set specific standards that give better guidance as to what constitutes an 
acceptable exaction.179 Indeed, two states have attempted codification of the 
Nollan/Dolan standard.180 While these statutes provide clear guidance for 
courts, developers, and local land use regulators, they run the risk of forcing 
all permit applications into the same fit, still leaving little discretion to the 
land use regulator.181 
A strict standard enforced across the board, however, is more desirable 
than the varying and often incomprehensible standards determined in the 
courtroom.182 Even if some permits are ultimately denied despite the own-
er’s flexibility regarding a condition that violates the statute, at least owners 
and city agencies are on notice as to what will constitute an outrageous con-
dition and are not tying up the courts with easy-to-resolve yet ongoing cas-
 
 175. See, e.g., ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 39, at § 2:82; Fenster, Failed Exactions, 
supra note 34, at 625, 640. 
 176. See, e.g., ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 39, at § 2:82. 
 177. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 643–44; see also Amicus 
Brief, supra note 126, at *13 (“Petitioner’s proposed expansion of the Nollan/Dolan doctrine 
is also unworkable because it would foster frequent, unsolvable controversies. Was the per-
mit denied because of the government’s inability to negotiate acceptable exactions, or for 
some other reason?”). 
 178. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608–09 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 179. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 643–44. 
 180. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.12 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-508 
(West 2013). 
 181. Mulvaney, Remnants, supra note 113, at 221. 
 182. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 645–48. 
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es.183 And, in the event the case does ultimately go to court, the judge will 
have a voter-approved standard to apply.184 
Discretion and flexibility in the permit process, however, are essential 
for city planning commissions to meet their long-term goals.185 By forcing 
these regulators to consider all permits in the strict light of Nollan and Do-
lan, and now Koontz, even supposing the cases had been codified to provide 
clear guidelines, the regulators are left with scant options in denying or ap-
proving permit applications in sync with an overarching and long-term 
plan.186 
Some states have enacted statutes that provide a bit more leeway by 
listing factors land use regulators may consider in approaching these condi-
tional applications.187 A combination of both should be considered: a clear 
definition of what will amount to an extortionate demand coupled with fac-
tors land use regulators are allowed to consider during negotiations. This 
combination will put local governments and developers on notice as to what 
is permitted and will give review boards a workable standard when the inev-
itable dispute arises. Additionally, should the review boards’ decisions be 
appealed to a judicial court, the courts will also have more guidance con-
cerning the land use agency’s intent in denying the application. 
On that note, it would be beneficial in dealing with these disputes to 
take them out of the court’s jurisdiction until administrative review has been 
exhausted. Administrative review boards, like local governments, are more 
familiar with the goals of both developers and land use regulators and are in 
a better position than courts to negotiate a compromise likely to be amena-
ble to both parties.188 These local officials can use discretion and flexibility, 
not only to manage workable compromises, but also to alleviate local voter 
anxiety concerning new developments and the potential effects on property 
 
 183. See, e.g., id. at 647. (“Another reason to use formulas to determine impact fees and 
exactions is that formulas, once developed, can be used repeatedly for land use applications, 
thereby simplifying regulatory practices. Indeed, legislative formulas applied mechanically 
can settle disputes wholesale, as opposed to the more time-consuming and variable approach 
of designing individualized exactions. To attract development, pro-growth communities have 
made their formulas transparent to create a predictable and palatable project approval regime. 
Moreover, municipalities that establish formulas based upon comprehensive, long-range 
plans are less likely to face takings liability. Courts are likely to find such formulas persua-
sive insofar as they appear to be part of an ordered, considered regulatory scheme rather than 
an effort to obtain concessions from individual landowners.”). 
 184. See id. at 645–48. 
 185. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 643–44. 
 186. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 645–48. 
 187. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (2012). These factors include a time frame 
for issuing the exaction, a method of appeal, and a provision for waiver of process, among 
others. Id. 
 188. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 645–48. 
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values.189 By keeping judicial remedy as a final resort, many of these land 
use disputes can be resolved efficiently and painlessly by those best situated 
to affect an outcome favorable to both parties, not to mention the taxpayers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz will have a drastic impact on 
municipality development. Courts are left with forcing an unworkable, rule-
formalist standard onto a variety of uniquely local issues. This will result in 
the stagnation of beneficial city development as developers, land use regula-
tors, and courts alike struggle with the ramifications of this decision. Permit 
negotiations between land use regulators and developers will cease as regu-
lators become wary of the heightened scrutiny now being applied to negotia-
tions. Additionally, courts will be forced into local land use battles where 
they are unfamiliar with the needs of the developer and the goals of the local 
governments. 
Nevertheless, cities should not be given a free pass to exact property 
rights from landowners however they see fit. But when a condition on a land 
use permit is truly extortionate, when a landowner’s rights have truly been 
impinged upon, courts should avoid the unnecessary confusion involved in 
analyzing the claim under takings jurisprudence. There is already a constitu-
tional remedy in place for redress of wronged rights: the claim sounds in due 
process, not takings. 
A better solution is necessary. By keeping review of permit conditions 
within the discretion of the state legislature or a local review board, with 
litigation as a last resort, the goals of both developers and city planners can 
be heard, and a compromise satisfactory to both parties can be reached 
without pigeonholing the permit into Nollan and Dolan. 
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